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STRUGGLING WITH CALIFORNIA'S KIDNAPING
TO COMMIT ROBBERY PROVISION
The California Penal Code contains two kidnaping statutes. Sim-
ple kidnaping, defined in section 207, carries a penalty of one to
twenty-five years' imprisonment.1 Section 209,2 bifurcated in its pro-
scription, defines the offenses which constitute aggravated kidnaping.
These offenses are punishable by either life imprisonment, life imprison-
ment without parole, or death.3
Section 207 has remained relatively unchanged since its enactment.
In contrast, section 209 has undergone several drastic amendments
during its seventy-five year history. The problems accompanying judi-
cial interpretation of these amendments have perplexed the courts and
evoked an abundance of legal commentary. Legal attention has cen-
tered on the reference in section 209 to an act which has become known
as kidnaping for the purpose of robbery.4
In 1969, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Daniels,5
which has become a landmark case in the law of kidnaping for robbery.
1. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 207-208 (West 1970).
2. "Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals,
kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or
detain, or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward or to commit
extortion or to exact from relatives or friends of such person any money or valuable
thing, or any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery, or
any person who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall suffer death in cases in which any person subjected to any such act suffers
death, or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life without
possibility of parole in cases in which any person subjected to any such act suffers bodily
harm, or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with possibility of
parole in cases where no such person suffers death or bodily harm.
"Any person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of
parole following a conviction under Section 209 as it read prior to September 22, 1951,
shall be eligible for a release on parole as if he had been sentenced to imprisonment for
life with possibility of parole." Id. § 209 (West Supp. 1976).
3. The degree of severity increases in proportion to the physical harm sustained
by the victim. When the victim is not injured, the penalty is life imprisonment. From
1933 until 1973, the punishment of either death or imprisonment without parole was
within the discretion of the jury in cases in which the victim suffered bodily harm. The
1973 amendment to section 209 removed this decision from the jury's discretion and
prescribed the death penalty only in cases in which the victim dies. Cal. Stat. 1973, ch.
719, § 5, at 1299 (codified at CAL. PEN. CODB § 190.2 (West Supp. 1976)).
4. The phrase "kidnaping for robbery" will be used in this note to refer to this
particular offense.
5. 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969).
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In Daniels, the court rejected a prior interpretation of section 209 and
established a new judicial interpretation of the term "kidnaping for
robbery."6 Under this new interpretation, the compelled movement of a
person during an act of robbery does not constitute kidnaping for
robbery if the movement is merely incidental to the robbery or if the
kidnaping does not substantially increase the victim's risk of injury
beyond the risk inherent in robbery. Although not required by the
Daniels interpretation, a two-prong test was subsequently developed by
the supreme court as a standard for determining whether a victim's
movement constitutes kidnaping for robbery. The purpose of this note
is to trace the development of kidnaping for robbery, and to evaluate
this two-prong test.
Initially, this note will discuss the historical background of aggra-
vated kidnaping. The examination will briefly trace section 209
through its first fifty years of development as California law and then
focus specifically on the statutory reference to kidnaping for robbery.
The discussion of kidnaping for robbery will concern possible interpre-
tations of the statutory language, judicial analysis culminating in the
decision in Daniels, and inconsistencies arising in application of the
current two-prong test. Finally, a more desirable method of determin-
ing kidnaping for robbery will be proposed.
Historical, Judicial and Legislative
Background of Section 209'
Early Development of Kidnaping
Kidnaping is an ancient crime, punished even under early Jewish8
and Roman law.9 At common law, kidnaping was considered false
imprisonment aggravated by a conveyance of the victim'" and was
defined as the "forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or
child from their own country and sending them into another."" Black-
stone referred to kidnaping as an unquestionably heinous crime and felt
its consequences to be productive of the most cruel and disagreeable
hardships.' 2  The punishment for kidnaping at common law was im-
6. See notes 114-30 & accompanying text infra.
7. In construing a statute, the court is free to study the history and purpose of the
enactment and the previous legislation on the subject. County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie,
19 Cal. 2d 634, 639, 122 P.2d 526, 529 (1942).
8. "He that stealeth a man and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall
surely be put to death." Exodus 21:16.
9. See 2 W. BuRmcK, THE LAW OF CRIME § 384 (1946).
10. See 1 W. HAWKINs, PLEAS OF TiE CRowN 119 (Curwood ed. 1824); R.
PERKINS, CRimINAL LAW 176-77 (2d ed. 1969).
11. 4 W. BLACKSTONF, COMMENTARIES *219.
12. Id.
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prisonment and pillory.
13
In the United States commission of the offense, even under the
common law, did not require that the victim be carried "into another
country" because the various states are foreign to each other for the
purpose of kidnaping. 14 Therefore, the customary definition of com-
mon law kidnaping in America became the "(1) unlawful and (2)
forcible abduction of (3) any person, (4) from one state and taking
him into another."' 5  Interest in common law kidnaping, however, is
now of only historical significance in the United States. All jurisdictions
currently punish kidnaping by statutes, some of which have extended
the scope of the offense.' 6 As in California, most states divide the
offense of kidnaping into degrees.lr
Simple and Aggravated Kidnaping in California
In 1872, the California legislature codified the offense of kidnap-
ing by enacting penal code section 207. Under this statute, kidnaping
was defined as a forcible seizure and carrying away of a victim into
another county, state, or country.' s Section 207 was later amended to
include the carrying "into another part of the same county."'" The
penalty for this kidnaping offense was prescribed in section 208 and
called for one to ten years' imprisonment. 20  This section 207 offense is
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550, 567 (1837).
15. 2W. BUtDIcK, THE LAW oF CRanm § 386 (1946).
16. See People v. Hope, 257 N.Y. 147, 150, 177 N.E. 402, 403 (1931).
17. See, e.g., ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-1 to -2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. PEN.
LAw § 135.20, 135.25 (McKinney 1975); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20.03-.04 (1974).
18. "Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in this state,
and carries him into another country, state or county, or who forcibly takes or arrests
any person, with a design to take him out of this state, without having established a
claim according to the laws of the United States or of this state, or who hires, persuades,
entices, decoys or seduces by false promises, misrepresentations or the like, any person to
go out of this state, or to be taken or removed therefrom, for the purpose and with the
intent to sell such person into slavery or involuntary servitude, or otherwise to employ
him for his own use, or to the use of another, without the free will and consent of such
persuaded person, is guilty of kidnaping." CAL. PEr. CODE § 207 (1872) (enacting
Crimes and Punishment Act, Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 99, §§ 53-55, at 234), as amended,
CAL. PEN. CODE § 207 (West 1970). See People v. Chu Quong, 15 Cal. 332, 333
(1860) (abduction must be accompanied by removal into another county, state, or
territory, or design to remove beyond state limits).
19. Cal. Stat. 1905, ch. 493, § 1, at 653. The advisability of this change was
shown by a supreme court decision in a case in which the victim was abducted and
carried from San Pedro, across twenty miles of ocean, to Santa Catalina Island. Since
both locales were within the county of Los Angeles, the act did not technically constitute
kidnaping under the 1872 statute. See Ex parte Keil, 85 Cal. 309, 24 P. 742 (1890).
20. CAL. PEN. CODE § 208 (1872), as amended, (West 1970). Since 1923, the
penalty for simple kidnaping has been from one to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Id.
§ 208 (West 1970).
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commonly referred to as simple kidnaping,"' because the statute does
not require that the kidnaping be committed for any specific purpose. 2
As kidnapings for ranson began to attract nationwide attention, 23
some states enacted statutes which provided harsher punishments for
such acts than were available for simple kidnaping.24 In 1901, the
California legislature added section 209 to the penal code to prohibit the
carrying away of any person for the purpose of pecuniary gain.25 Section
209 prohibited (1) the asportation of a victim with the intent to commit
extortion or robbery, and (2) the asportation of a victim with the intent
to demand ransom. The penalty for such acts was made more severe
than the penalty for simple kidnaping. 6 While this 1901 version of
section 209 did not use the term "kidnaping," the offenses proscribed by
the provision have been termed "aggravated kidnapings. ' 27 Significant-
ly, while aggravated kidnaping differed from simple kidnaping in the
severity of its punishment and the necessity for a specific intent to extort,
rob, or demand ransom, the gravamen of both section 207 and section
209 was a traditional asportation requirement.
1932: Kidnaping as a Federal Offense
In the 1920's, kidnapings for ransom occurred at an alarming
rate.2 The professional criminals of the Prohibition era, taking advan-
tage of the inadequacies of the law and public indifference, kidnaped
21. Simple kidnaping is distinct from aggravated kidnaping. The latter term
describes a kidnapping which has, in addition to the kidnaping itself, another criminal
object. See notes 25-27 & accompanying text infra.
22. Prior to the enactment of section 207 in 1872, kidnaping for ransom was
apparently uncommon. See Fisher & McGuire, Kidnaping and the So-Called Lindbergh
Law, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 646, 649 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Fisher & McGuire].
23. Up until this time, the country was so sparsely settled, and communication
facilities were so primitive, that little attention was paid to the rare instances of
kidnaping except by the inhabitants of the particular locales in which they occurred. See
id. at 649-50.
24. See, e.g., Ill. Stat. 1901, § 1, at 145.
25. "Every person who maliciously, forcibly, or fraudulently takes or entices away
any person with intent to restrain such person and thereby to commit extortion or
robbery, or exact from the relatives or friends of such person any money or valuable
thing, is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished therefor by imprisonment in the state's
prison for life, or any number of years not less than ten." Cal. Stat. 1901, ch. 83, § 1, at
98.
26. The maximum penalty for simple kidnaping was ten years' imprisonment. See
note 20 supra. The punishment for this section 209 offense was imprisonment for ten
years to life. Cal. Stat. 1901, ch. 83, § 1, at 98.
27. 1 B. WiTmN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, § 355, at 326 (1963).
28. See Findley, The Lindbergh Law, 28 GEo. L.J. 908, 909 (1940). During this
decade arose the famous Leopold and Loeb case, which was defended by Clarence
Darrow. See generally H. HIGDON, THE CRIME OF THE CENTURY (1975).
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citizens to extort large sums of money. 9 The abduction of the Lind-
bergh baby in 1932 aroused nationwide sentiment against these com-
monplace kidnapings for ranson.30
The Federal Kidnaping Act,3' commonly called the Lindbergh
Law, was enacted at the peak of this public outrage."2 Kidnaping had
become a science with the "[dietails of the seizures and detentions...
fully and meticulously worked out in advance," 33 and "[r]ansom was
the usual motive. '34  The federal law was designed to enable federal
assistance in interstate kidnaping cases in order to compensate for the
inadequacies of local police agencies.3 5 The punishment originally
prescribed by the Federal Kidnaping Act was imprisonment for any
term of years to be decided by the court.3 6 Shortly after the law was
enacted, in an effort to deter physical abuse of the victim, the range of
sanctions available to the court was broadened to include the death
penalty unless the victim was liberated unharmed.3 7 The federal statute
also included the requirement that the victim by held specifically for
ransom or reward 8 Thus, the Federal Kidnaping Act differed from
both California's simple kidnaping statute, which required no specific
purpose for the kidnapping, 9 and California's aggravated kidnaping
29. The criminal entrepreneurs of this era had used kidnaping as a means of
enforcing their underworld code. With this experience, they were able to use kidnaping
for ransom as a highly sophisticated and lucrative business. See generally E. SULLIVAN,
Tn SNATCH RAcKEr (1931).
30. See Findley, The Lindbergh Law, 28 GFo. LJ. 908, 910 (1940).
31. "[W]hoever shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or aid or
abet in transporting, in interstate or foreign commerce, any person who shall have been
unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away by
any means whatsoever and held for ransom or reward shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for such term of years as the court, in its discretion,
shall determine . . . ." Act of June 22, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326, as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis added).
32. In December 1931, three months before the kidnaping of the Lindbergh baby,
identical bills, S. 1525 and H.R. 5657, had been introduced in the respective houses of
Congress. See S. 1525, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931); H.R. 5657, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1931). After the kidnaping, action on these bills was delayed owing to fear that an
increased likelihood of arrest or a heavily increased penalty enacted at that time would
prevent the safe return of the child. See 75 CoNG. REC. 13285, 13291 (1932).
33. Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 463 (1946).
34. Id.
35. Detection and apprehension of kidnapers by local officials was seriously
hampered when criminals crossed a state line and thereby terminated, for all practical
purposes, the jurisdiction and ability to arrest of their pursuers. See Hearings on HS.
5657 Before House Comm. on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4 (1932). See also
75 CONG. REC. 13285, 13291-92 (1932).
36. Act of June 22, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
37. Act of May 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-232, 48 Stat. 781.
38. See note 31 supra.
39. See note 21 & accompanying text supra.
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statute, which specified as alternative purposes of the crime the intents
to demands ransom, to commit extortion, and to commit robbery.
40
1933: Amendment to California's Aggravated Kidnaping Law
In 1933, one year after enactment of the federal kidnaping legisla-
tion, the California legislature amended section 209. This amendment
severely harshened the sanction of section 209 by raising the minimum
penalty to life imprisonment, with the augmented penalties of either life
imprisonment without parole or death if the victim was injured. 1 More-
over, the wording of the amendment drastically changed the nature of
the offense-a result which the legislature apparently did not intend.42
The language of the 1933 amendment evidenced a heavy reliance
upon the Federal Kidnaping Act.4" The California legislature did not,
however, include the federal law's requirement of asportation in its
amendment to section 209.44 This exclusion of asportation as an
absolute requirement was not entirely illogical. The California legisla-
ture was probably concerned primarily with ransom abduction, the focus
of the Federal Kidnaping Act. This offense can occur without asporta-
tion of the victim. 45  In fact, the requirement of asportation in the
federal enactment was apparently inserted to provide federal jurisdiction
under the commerce clause.40  Nevertheless, in the context of section
40. See notes 25 & accompanying text supra.
41. "Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, con-
ceals, kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to
hold or detain, or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward or to commit
extortion or robbery or to exact from relatives or friends of such person any money or
valuable thing, or who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment in the State
prison for life without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same,
in cases in which the person or persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer
bodily harm or shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison for life with
possibility of parole in cases where such person or persons do not suffer bodily harm."
Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 1025, § 1, at 2617-18 (emphasis added).
42. See notes 52-54 & accompanying text infra.
43. Compare the italicized portion of note 31 supra, with the italicized portion of
note 41 supra.
44. Kidnaping and other acts involving asportation, as well as acts not requiring
movement of the victim, were included within the 1933 amendment. Since the acts were
listed in the alternative, asportation was not a requirement for violation of section 209.
See note 41 supra.
45. "[Wihenever a victim is seized for the purpose of ransom, reward, extortion,
or exacting something of value from friends or relatives, no asportation of the victim is
necessary to constitute a violation of section 209." People v. Macinnes, 30 Cal. App. 3d
838, 844, 106 Cal. Rptr. 589, 592 (1973). The Model Penal Code is in agreement:
"There are cases where the victim is held in a place of isolation for a substantial period.
Thus, a man might be seized in his own summer home in the mountains and held there
for ransom." MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1, Comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
46. See Bailey v. United States, 74 F.2d 451, 453 (10th Cir. 1934). For a
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209, elimination of the asportation requirement had a fundamental and
somewhat startling effect. As amended, the statute proscribed: seizing,
confining, inveigling, enticing, decoying, abducting, concealing, kidnap-
ing, carrying away, holding or detaining.47 Moreover, unlike the feder-
al law, section 209 was not limited to the intent to demand ransom; the
1933 amendment, like the original version of section 209, included as
well the intent to commit extortion or robbery.
48
It was this retention of intent to commit robbery, coupled with the
addition of acts not requiring asportation, that produced the unusual
result in the 1933 amendment. Under the wording of the amendment,
any of the specified acts constituted a violation of section 209 when
accompanied by any of the specified intents. Thus, the mere holding of
an individual to commit robbery constituted a section 209 offense.49
This result represented a dramatic departure from the proscription of
the 1901 version of the statute. Prior to 1933, an act of robbery evoked
the sanctions of section 209 only if the robbery included an asportation
of the victim.50 In such a case, the act of robbery was punished under
section 213, governing robbery, and section 209 applied as well, be-
cause the offender had carried away the victim with the intent to commit
robbery. Under the 1933 amendment, however, every act of robbery
violated section 209. Since any act of robbery included a holding or
detention for that purpose, even a standstill robbery was punishable as
both robbery under section 213 and aggravated kidnaping under section
209.51
The legislature probably did not intend to broaden the scope of
section 209 to encompass standstill robberies. 52 The legislative coun-
sel's report 3 to the governor enumerated only three effects of the
amendment: (1) the penalty would be increased; (2) an accomplice
who aided in any part of the crime would be guilty as a principal; and
discussion of the Lindbergh Law's reliance upon the commerce clause to bring kidnap-
ping within federal jurisdiction see Fisher & McGuire, supra note 22, at 656.
47. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 1025, § 1, at 2617.
48. Id.
49. "Every person who . . . holds or detains, such individual . . . to commit
extortion or robbery. . . is guilty of a felony. . . ." Id.
50. Cal. Stat. 1901, ch. 83, § 1, at 98.
51. See notes 55-76 & accompanying text infra.
52. Assemblyman C. W. Lyon, member of the Judiciary Committee of the 1933
legislature, was present at all discussions of the amendment on the assembly floor and in
the Judiciary Committee. In a sworn statement, Assemblyman Lyon commented,
"Simple detention during a robbery was never discussed before the Committee, and it was
not our intention to make such detention kidnaping." Comment, Robbery Becomes
Kidnaping, 3 STAN. L. REv. 156, 159 (1950), quoting Affidavit of Charles W. Lyon,
Supplemental Exhibits for the Appellant at 3, People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238
P.2d 1001 (1951).
53. See generally CAL. Gov'r CODE §§ 10230-46 (West 1966 & Supp. 1976).
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(3) the requirement that the act be done maliciously would be omit-
ted.54 If the legislature had intended to alter completely the nature of
aggravated kidnaping by wholly eliminating the requirement of asporta-
tion, the legislative counsel's report would certainly have reflected this
fundamental change.
Initial Judicial Treatment of Section 209's 1933 Amendment
People v. Tanner55 was the first case in which the supreme court
considered the effect of the 1933 amendment on the asportation require-
ment and the other elements of section 209. The defendants in Tanner
forced the victim at gunpoint from his driveway into his house. There
they tortured and interrogated him for over an hour about the location
of money they believed he had hidden. On appeal from their convic-
tions under section 209, the defendants objected to the validity of the
1933 amendment, arguing that the acts described in section 209 widely
departed from the common law requirement of carrying away the
victim. In affirming the defendants' convictions,"6 the court in Tanner
rejected this argument and held the 1933 amendment valid.57 The
court stated that the common law definition of kidnaping had long since
become obsolete and that the legislature owed no allegiance to such an
archaic form.
58
The defendants in People v. Raucho5 9 mounted a similar challenge
to the 1933 amendment in an effort to reverse their convictions for
aggravated kidnaping. These convictions were based on two sidewalk
holdups during which the victims were moved across the street. The
defendants contended that the 1933 amendment to section 209 required
both a seizing and a carrying away of the victim. The court in Raucho
rejected this contention, pointing out that "the statute plainly declares
that either the seizing or the kidnaping or carrying away is a felony
under its provisions, where the intent to commit robbery appears. '"S °
54. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, REPORT ON ASSEMBLY BILL No. 334
(1933), quoted in People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 200, 217 P.2d 1, 16 (1950).
55. 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 (1935).
56. The court in Tanner was not required to hold that a mere detaining for
robbery constituted aggravated kidnaping, since the crime in question had involved a
fifty-foot asportation and would thus have been punishable under the provisions of the
original section. The court in Tanner admitted that "so far as it affects the appellants
herein [the amendment to section 209] relates only to increased punishment." Id. at 294,
44 P.2d at 331.
57. Id. The court in Tanner also commented on the removal of the requirement
of asportation from section 209: "The section as amended provides that every person
who seizes, confines, kidnaps or who holds or detains any person for the purpose of
committing extortion or robbery is guilty of a felony." Id.
58. Id. at 296, 44 P.2d at 332.
59. 8 Cal. App. 2d 655, 47 P.2d 1108 (1935).
60. Id. at 663, 47 P.2d at 1112.
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The court reasoned further that the 1933 amendment changed section
209 from an offense "which required the asportation of the victim to
one in which the act of seizing [the victim] for ransom, reward or to
commit extortion or robbery became a felony." '
The courts in both Tanner and Raucho suggested that section 209
could be violated without a movement of the victim. Nevertheless, the
facts of both Tanner and Raucho involved asportation of the victims.
Thus, neither court was squarely confronted with a conviction of aggra-
vated kidnaping based on a robbery in which the victim remained
stationary. Not until 1950 did a case arise in which prosecution under
section 209 depended upon the portion of the 1933 amendment which
made a mere holding or detaining for robbery an aggravated kidnap-
ing.
People v. Knowles: Aggravated Kidnaping Without Asportation
In 1950, the supreme court considered the case of People v.
Knowles,62 which concerned convictions under section 209 in circum-
stances involving only minimal movements of the victims. The holding
of the supreme court in Knowles, while strictly a literal interpretation of
the statute, shook the legal community.63  In Knowles, the owner and
the clerk of a clothing store were forced into a stockroom, where the
defendant took their wallets. The defendant's accomplice, Chessman'
forced the clerk to open the cash register, from which additional money
was taken. Prior to the robbers' escape, the defendant struck the owner
on the head with the barrel of his gun.65 The court in Knowles
affirmed the defendant's aggravated kidnaping convictions, but reversed
his robbery convictions.66
61. Id.
62. 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950).
63. See Comment, Judicial Construction of Kidnaping Statutes, 15 ALBANY L.
REV. 65 (1951); Comment, Robbery Becomes Kidnaping, 3 STAN. L REv. 156 (1950);
38 CAL. L. Rav. 920 (1950); 24 S. CAL. L. Rav. 310 (1951).
64. Chessman was tried separately. See notes 94-101 & accompanying text infra.
65. 35 Cal. 2d at 178, 217 P.2d at 2. This assault was the basis for the finding
that one aggravated kidnaping had involved bodily harm to the victim. Accordingly,
Knowles could have been punished by either death or life imprisonment without parole.
The jury sentenced Knowles to life imprisonment without parole. Id. at 177, 217 P.2d at
2.
66. Id. at 189, 217 P.2d at 9. The court held that since Knowles's convictions
were based on the commission of a single act, Penal Code section 654 precluded
punishment for both robbery and aggravated kidnaping: "Since he committed only a
single, indivisible act, Penal Code, section 654, requires that he be punished only once
therefor. In view of the fact that the Legislature prescribed greater punishment for the
violation of section 209 it must be deemed to have considered that the more serious
offense, and the convictions thereunder must be the ones affirmed." Id. at 189, 217 P.2d
at 9.
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Writing the opinion for a sharply divided court,67 Justice Traynor
rejected the defendant's contention that section 209 applied only to
orthodox kidnapings which entailed an asportation rather than the mere
detention of a victim during an armed robbery. Upon examining the
language of the statute, Justice Traynor stated that movement of the
victim was only one of several methods by which section 209 could be
violated. In his view, the 1933 amendment deliberately abandoned the
requirement of movement of the victim which had originally character-
ized aggravated kidnaping. s Although apparently questioning the eq-
uity of a literal interpretation of section 209,69 Justice Traynor found no
basis for concluding that the legislature had not meant what it had said.
Since the words of the statute were easily understood, Justice Traynor
reasoned, the court should not convolute those words to accomplish a
purpose which did not appear on the face of the statute.
The majority in Knowles also held that the standstill robbery in the
case at bar violated section 211, the robbery provision, as well as the
aggravated kidnapping section."° Since the violation of these two offens-
es rested upon the commission of a single act, however, punishment
was necessarily restricted to a single provision. 71 The court in Knowles
recognized this limitation and chose the sanctions of section 209, stat-
ing: "In view of the fact that the Legislature prescribed greater punish-
ment for the violation of section 209 it must be deemed to have
considered that the more serious offense, and the convictions thereunder
must be the one affirmed.
72
Justice Edmunds, with Chief Justice Gibson concurring, dissented
in Knowles to the convictions for aggravated kidnaping. He labeled
the majority interpretation of section 209 a "startling innovation in
criminal law" under which an act of robbery is also kidnaping. 73 In a
grammatical and historical examination of the aggravated kidnaping
provision, Justice Edmunds maintained that the 1933 amendment clear-
67. Knowles resulted in a 4-3 split on the court. For a discussion of the dissenting
opinions see notes 73-76 & accompanying text infra.
68. 35 Cal. 2d 182, 217 P.2d at 5.
69. Justice Traynor apparently realized that this interpretation, which punished
armed robbery as aggravated kidnaping, would meet with disfavor: "Reasonable men
may regard the statute as unduly harsh and therefore unwise; if they do, they should
address their doubts to the Legislature. It is not for the courts to nullify a statute merely
because it may be unwise." Id. at 180, 217 P.2d at 3.
70. Id. at 186, 217 P.2d at 7. The majority in Knowles did not, however, hold
that all robberies violated section 209. Rather, the majority emphasized that the robbery
had lasted fifteen or twenty minutes. Justice Traynor felt this circumstance clearly
indicated that the victims had been "held and detained" to commit robbery. See id. at
181, 217 P.2d at 4.
71. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 654 (West 1970).
72. 35 Cal. 2d at 89, 217 P.2d at 9.
73. Id. at 190, 217 P.2d at 9-10 (Edmunds, J., dissenting).
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ly indicated that one could commit robbery without also committing a
kidnaping. Justice Edmunds felt that the severe punishment provided
in section 209 was an obvious indication that detention incidental to
robbery did not constitute aggravated kidnaping.
7 4
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Carter agreed with Justice
Edmunds's dissenting view that the severity of the sanctions in section
209 should be reserved for the more classical kidnapings. Justice
Carter also felt the majority in Knowles made every robbery a violation
of both the robbery statute and the aggravated kidnaping statute,75
thereby giving the district attorney the power to prosecute acts of
robbery with the sanctions of either section. Justice Carter reasoned
that this power was unwarranted because the legislature did not intend to
punish acts of robbery with the severe sanctions provided for aggravated
kidnaping.7 6
Inception of "Kidnaping for Robbery"
The decision in Knowles seemed to awaken the legal community to
the inadequacies of the 1933 amendment to section 209: The sanctions
of section 209 could be applied to every act of robbery rather than
imposed as an additional penalty when the robber carried away the
victim. Accordingly, a standstill robbery could be punished under
section 209 with a minimum term of life imprisonment,7 7 while the
robbery statutes prescribed a minimum penalty of one year's imprison-
ment for the same act.
78
Legal commentators strongly objected to the Knowles decision and
urged the court to seek the spirit of the law and to avoid constructions
leading to absurdities. 79 Yet an emphatic statement by Justice Traynor
in the majority opinion in Knowles indicated that any interpretive
change would have to be made by the legislature.80 Consequently, the
74. See id. at 196, 217 P.2d at 14. "Unquestionably, the Legislature has the power
to make either attempted robbery or robbery a capital offense. But in my opinion,
considering both the language and historical background of section 209, it has not done
so." Id. at 191, 217 P.2d at 10 (Edmunds, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 203, 217 P.2d at 18.
76. "On the contrary, it is clear that [the legislature] did not intend to embrace
the crime of robbery in section 209 of the Penal Code .. . . The Legislature has
carefully defined robbery and fixed its punishment .... If it had intended to depart
from those provisions, it would have done so directly by amending the robbery statute. It
would not have attempted to achieve that result by amending section 209, the kidnap
statute." Id. at 204, 217 P.2d at 18 (Carter, J., dissenting).
77. CAL. PEN. CODE § 209 (West 1970 & Supp. 1976).
78. Id. § 213 (West 1970).
79. See, Comment, Judicial Construction of Kidnaping Statutes, 15 ALBANY L.
Rav. 65 (1951); Comment, Robbery Becomes Kidnaping, 3 STAN. L. Rav. 156 (1950);
38 CAL. L. Rnv. 920 (1950); 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 310 (1951).
80. See note 69 supra.
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legislature responded to Knowles almost immediately, amending section
209 in the next regular legislative session. 8' This 1951 amendment,
however, was not a panacea.
The 1951 Amendment to Section 209
The most logical solution available to the legislature was to return
section 209 to its former status as strictly an aggravated kidnaping
statute which imposed harsh penalties for kidnapings committed in
conjunction with the specific intent to rob, extort, or hold for ransom.
Such a result could best have been achieved by excising from section
209 the activities not involving asportation and enacting a separate
statute to punish the holding of a person for ransom. Thus, robbery,
extortion, and holding for ransom would not have been punishable
under section 209 unless they involved asportation; however, each act
would in any case have been punishable under a statute directed solely
at the specific offense.
The legislature's 1951 amendment, however, simply repeated the
proscription against commission of the enumerated acts, which included
mere holding and detaining as well as kidnaping, when the underlying
intent was to demand ransom. 2  The only actual amendment was the
deletion of the intent to commit robbery from this proscription and the
requirement of an asportation when the intent was to commit robbery.
The product of this legislative action was the phrase: "any person who
kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery."8 3 Thus, by
no longer punishing the mere holding of a person with the intent to
commit robbery, the 1951 amendment prohibited the application of
section 209 to a standstill robbery and created the specific offense of
kidnaping for robbery.
81. "Any person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals,
kidnaps or carries away any individual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or
detain, or who holds or detains, such individual for ransom, reward or to commit
extortion or to exact from relatives or friends of such person any money or valuable
thing, or any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery, or
any person who aids or abets any such act, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
life without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in
which the person or persons subjected to such kidnaping suffers or suffer bodily harm or
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with possibility of parole in
cases where such person or persons do not suffer bodily harm.
"Any person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of
parole following a conviction under this section as it read prior to the effective date of
this act shall be eligible for a release on parole as if he had been sentenced to
imprisonment for life with possibility of parole." Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1749, § 1, at 4167.
82. See id.
83. Hereinafter, the phrase "kidnaps . . to commit robbery" will be used to refer
to this statutory language.
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As a result of the 1951 amendment, section 209 defines two
fundamentally different offenses:
(1) "Ransom Abductions": the seizing (holding or carrying
away) of a person with the intent to demand ransom from a different
person; and
(2) "Kidnapings for Robbery": the asportation of a person
with the intent to commit robbery.s4
While a ransom abduction therefore qualifies as aggravated kidnap-
ing, there is no requirement that the victim be carried away.85 On the
other hand, an act of robbery triggers the applicability of section 209
only if there has been an asportation of the victim.8 6 In such a case,
conviction of both robbery and aggravated kidnapping is permissible,
since the offenses do not rest on a single indivisible act.8 7
The court has experienced little or no difficulty with ransom
abductions under section 209. The phrase "kidnaps ...to commit
robbery," however, has been troublesome because it is imprecisely and
ambiguously worded. The remainder of this note specifically focuses
on the offense of kidnaping for robbery, which has remained unaltered
by the legislature since the 1951 amendment.
Interpretive Possibilities of "Kidnaps ... To Commit Robbery"
The meaning of kidnaping for robbery is inadequately described by
the twelve-word phrase contained in section 209. For example, no-
where in section 209 does the legislature define the term "kidnaps." At
least three different definitions can logically be attached to this term.
The legislature might have intended kidnaps to mean any movement
whatsoever. Perhaps, however, the legislature envisioned the common
law definition, which requires an asportation into another state. A third
possibility is that the legislature referred to kidnaps in section 209
according to the definition of simple kidnaping in section 207.
Even if any particular definition of kidnaps is assumed to be
correct, the meaning of "kidnaps ... to commit robbery" remains
nebulous. Since the legislature failed to state the circumstances under
which such a kidnaping violates section 209, the applicability of the
statute is debatable. For instance, one can interpret the statute as
requiring the existence of certain factors in addition to the mere pres-
ence of the intent to commit robbery before such a kidnapping is punish-
able under section 209. On the other hand, the statute can be read to




87. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 654 (West 1970).
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apply the sanctions of section 209 every time such a kidnaping is
committed for the purpose of robbery. Because the legislature failed to
provide any guideline in this regard, one can only speculate as to the
legislative intent underlying the offense. Three different applications
are reasonable:
Automatic Application: The legislature might have intended to use
the severe sanctions of section 209 to penalize any kidnaping for the
purpose of robbery. This application would give "kidnaps . . . to
commit robbery" a broad scope because the kidnap victim could be a
bystander rather than the robbery victim; also, the asportation could
occur either before or after the booty was obtained. Furthermore, the
robber would commit aggravated kidnaping even if asportation is not
necessary to obtain the booty, but is used merely to aid escape or to
frustrate apprehension. Even is the assailant inadvertantly moves the
victim, he could be guilty of kidnaping for robbery.
This interpretation is supported by a literal reading of the amend-
ment, which states that "any person who kidnaps or carries away any
person to commit robbery" violates section 209. The only explicit
requirement for the kidnaping is the motivation of robbery. In fact, the
amendment's language plainly rejects the requirement that the kidnap
victim be moved with the intention of robbing "such individual." 88 Also,
since an act of robbery continues until the robber has reached a place of
relative safety,89 it would seem that the movement could occur before or
after the seizure of the booty. If the movement can occur after the
booty is seized, the movement need not be essential to acquiring the
booty. Under this automatic application, then, the severe sanctions of
section 209 would punish the kidnaping of any person during any stage
of a robbery.
Restrictive Application: Perhaps the legislature intended kidnaping
for robbery to apply only to kidnapings which are absolutely necessary
to commit the robbery. Under this reading of the statutory language,
"kidnaps . . . to commit robbery" would be restricted to the factual
situation in which (1) the property is not within the victim's immediate
possession,9" so that (2) asportation is necessary to unite the victim with
88. Prior to the 1951 amendment, section 209 had always required that the act of
kidnaping an individual be accompanied by the intent to rob "such individual." See
notes 25, 41 supra. This language was not repeated in the 1951 amendment. See note 81
supra.
89. See People v. Carroll, 1 Cal. 3d 581, 585, 463 P.2d 400, 402, 83 Cal. Rptr.
176, 178 (1970).
90. The phrase "immediate possession" is used here as it is defined in the context
of robbery. The restrictive interpretation does not apply to those robberies in which the
desired booty, prior to asportation, is: (1) on the body of the victim; or (2) so within
his reach, inspection or control that he could, if not prevented by violence or fear, retain
possession of it. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 278-79 (2d ed. 1969).
1348 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
KIDNAPING TO COMMIT ROBBERY
the desired booty. In this factual situation, the kidnap victim and
robbery victim are necessarily the same person, and the asportation must
necessarily occur before the act of seizing the booty. In addition, the
kidnaping is essential to the robbery because the property is not availa-
ble at the place of initial confrontation.
This restrictive application is supported by the history of the statute
and the language and purpose of the amendment. Prior to 1951,
section 209 had always required that the kidnap victim be the intended
or actual robbery victim.91 Perhaps the legislature assumed this re-
quirement would continue under the 1951 amendment. The require-
ment that the kidnaping must come before the booty is obtained finds
support in the language "to commit robbery." An act of robbery is
committed at the moment the booty is seized. Therefore, if the booty
could be seized without asportation, or if the movement comes after the
booty is seized, the purpose of the asportation is to facilitate rather than
to commit robbery. Finally, the amendment sought to avoid the result
allowed by the decision in Knowles of applying section 209 to every act
of robbery.92  Since almost every robbery entails movement, 93 it is
reasonable to assume that the amendment was intended to reserve
kidnaping for robbery for movements which are essential rather than
optional.
Selective Application: The intention of the legislature may have
been to apply the sanctions of section 209 to any kidnaping which
creates additional dangers over and above the dangers caused by rob-
bery. Under this third interpretation, the applicability of "kidnaps...
to commit robbery" would not depend on who is kidnaped or at what
point during the robbery the kidnaping takes places, nor would an
inquiry be required in each case into whether the movement is necessary
to obtain the booty. This approach is similar to the automatic applica-
tion except that more would be required under selective application than
the kidnaping of some person for robbery: only those kidnapings which
increase the dangers over those attributable to robbery would constitute
kidnaping for robbery. Since the assailant will be punished in any case
for the act of robbery, a selective application would attach the additional
penalties of section 209 only when the kidnaping is so significant that it
creates additional dangers.
People v. Chessman: Initial Judicial Treatment of "Kidnaps ... To
Commit Robbery"
"Kidnaps. . .to commit robbery," as found in section 209 since
91. See note 88 supra.
92. See notes 73-77 & accompanying text supra.
93. See People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d
793, 796 (1965); Enright, California's Aggravated Kidnaping Statute-A Need for
Revision, 4 SAN DmGo L. RFv. 285 (1967).
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the 1951 amendment, was first interpreted by the supreme court in the
case of People v. Chessman. 4 The court's definition of the word
"kidnaps" and implementation of the phrase "kidnaps. . .to commit
robbery" in Chessman gave the offense a broad interpretation.
Caryl Chessman95 was convicted in a consolidated case of 17
felonies, four of which were kidnaping for robbery. Two of these
kidnaping for robbery charges arose from the clothing store robbery
committed with Knowles.96 The other two section 209 convictions
involved the robbery and abduction of women who were compelled by
Chessman to submit to sex crimes. For these latter two incidents,
Chessman was convicted of kidnaping for robbery with infliction of
bodily harm and received the death penalty. All the judgments were
affirmed by the supreme court on appeal. 97
In considering the defendant's convictions of kidnaping for rob-
bery, the supreme court in Chessman commented upon the effect of the
1951 amendment to section 209,98 noting, "The detention of the victim
during the commission of an armed robbery, if committed since the
1951 amendment, is not punishable under section 209."11 This exclu-
sion of standstill robberies from the scope of section 209 was clearly
indicated by the amendment. The meaning of "kidnaps. . .to commit
robbery," however, was subject to judicial interpretation. The court in
Chessman construed that language broadly, stating that "[it is the fact,
not the distance of forcible removal which constitutes kidnaping
.... "100 Furthermore, since the mere fact of movement was suffi-
cient, the court apparently gave .... kidnaps. . . to commit robbery" an
automatic application. The Chessman court, consequently, made al-
most every robber subject to the severe sanctions of aggravated kidnap-
94. 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001 (1951).
95. See generally F. PARKER, CARYL CHESSMAN: THE RED LIGHT BANDIT (1975).
96. See text accompanying notes 62-65 supra.
97. 38 Cal. 2d at 193, 238 P.2d at 1017.
98. Chessman's violations of section 209 occurred prior to the 1951 amendment.
Chessman argued, however, that the 1951 amendment showed a legislative intent that an
armed robbery committed between the 1933 and 1951 amendments not be punishable
under section 209 if the judgment of conviction was not final as of the 1951 amendment.
The court agreed that the amendment had retroactive effect and would apply to the two
death penalties if the defendant's conduct had been no more than robbery with infliction
of bodily harm. The court held, however, that Chessman's acts had been more than
mere armed robbery, as he had kidnaped and carried away two of the victims. Because
this conduct remained punishable after the 1951 amendment, there was no reason for
reversal. See id. at 191-93, 238 P.2d at 1016-17.
99. Jd. at 191, 238 P.2d at 1016. The court also held that under the second
paragraph of the amended statute, all persons (such as Knowles) held under sentences of
life imprisonment without possibility of parole for section 209 violations prior to the
amendment were eligible for parole. See id.
100. Id. at 192, 238 P.2d at 1017 (emphasis added).
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ing, since almost every robbery involves at least some slight move-
ment.' 01
In People v. Wein,'02 the supreme court followed the Chessman
rule that kidnaping for robbery was dependant upon only the fact of
movement and not the distance traveled. 10 3 The court in Wein affirmed
the defendant's convictions on five counts of kidnaping for robbery.1°
These convictions arose from the defendant's acts of raping and robbing
several women within the confines of their homes, forcing each to move
no more than from one room to another or across a single room.
When the defendant in Wein contended that the movement of the
victims was not sufficient to establish kidnaping under section 209, the
court cited Chessman and held:
Here, the testimony of some of the victims fixed the amounts of
movement at distances ranging from a few feet up to more than
50 feet. Under the reasoning and language of the Chessman case,
any of these distances sufficed for a conviction under [section
2091.105
Thus, Wein restated the Chessman view that kidnaping for robbery
could be established by even a slight movement. 0 6  In addition, the
result in Wein showed that the entire act of kidnaping could be commit-
ted within the confines of one room.1'07
101. People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793,
796 (1965). Enright, California's Aggravated Kidnaping Statute-A Need for Revision,
4 SAN Dmio L. REv. 285 (1967).
102. 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958).
103. See id. at 399-400, 326 P.2d at 466. The Chessman attitude of "fact, not
distance" also became a factor in the implementation of the simple kidnaping statute
(section 207). See, e.g., People v. Rich, 177 Cal. App. 2d 617, 2 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1960).
Although Chessman involved section 209, the court in Rich applied the Chessman
rationale to a conviction of simple kidnaping in its statement that "distance, route taken,
or area covered" are immaterial considerations. Id. at 621, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
104. 50 Cal. 2d at 411-12, 326 P.2d at 473. The defendant in Wein had been
charged and found guilty of three counts of robbery (section 211), six counts of rape
(section 261 (3)), six counts of sex perversion (section 288a), two counts of simple
kidnaping (section 207), and five counts of kidnaping for robbery (section 209). The
jury found that in each act of kidnaping for robbery the victim suffered bodily injury.
The penalty for each count of kidnaping for robbery had been fixed at death. Id. at 391,
326 P.2d at 461.
105. Id. at 400, 326 P.2d at 466.
106. The dissenting opinion in Wein described one incident that had been held to be
kidnaping for robbery and for which the death penalty had been fixed. Wein seized the
victim in her bedroom and demanded her money, but he did not take the one dollar he
found in her wallet. He then "helped [her] up on the bed" where he raped her. Thus,
the defendant's subsequent conviction on this count of kidnaping for robbery was based
on a movement which consisted only of the distance between the floor and the bed: four
or five feet. See id. at 412, 326 P.2d at 474 (Carter, J., dissenting).
107. Prior to Wein, none of the section 207 convictions which had been reviewed
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The court's broad interpretation of "kidnaps ...to commit rob-
bery" was severely criticized. Commentators urged the court to exclude
the trivial or incidental movement of a robbery victim from the scope of
aggravated kidnaping. They argued that basing a kidnaping for rob-
bery conviction on such insignificant movements emasculated the pur-
pose of the 1951 amendment. 10 8 The supreme court, however, contin-
ued to uphold its broad interpretation of kidnaping for robbery for
almost eighteen years.
Reinterpretation of "Kidnaps . . To Commit Robbery"
and Development of a Two-Prong Test
The broad interpretation of "kidnaps . . . to commit robbery"
formulated by the court in Chessman and Wein was rejected in the 1969
case of People v. Daniels."9 In Daniels, the court redefined the term
"kidnaping" in section 209 and adopted the selective application ap-
proach to the offense of kidnaping for robbery. In subsequent cases,
the court has cited the opinion in Daniels as authority in the develop-
ment of the current two-pronged test for kidnaping for robbery. 10
People v. Daniels: Aligning the Judicial Interpretation of "Kidnaps...
To Commit Robbery"
The kidnaping for robbery convictions in People v. Daniels arose
from the robbery and rape of three women in their own homes. In each
case, the defendants forced their way into the residence, and each victim
was moved at gunpoint to get her purse or to see if anyone was in
another room. Each movement was within the same room or from one
room to another. The distances of the movements were thirty feet,
eighteen feet, and six feet. A jury found the defendants guilty on all
counts, and the penalty for the kidnaping for the robbery convictions
was fixed at death."'
Although the court reversed the defendants' convictions under
section 209, it admitted that "[u]nder the rule of Chessman and Wein,
such brief movements of the victims would constitute 'kidnaping and
carrying away' within the meaning of the statute and would therefore be
had involved asportations entirely within one enclosure. See id. at 416, 326 P.2d at 477
(Carter, J., dissenting).
108. See generally Note, Kidnaping and the Element of Asportation, 35 S. CAL. L.
REv. 212 (1962); Comment, Room-to-Room Movement: A Risk Rationale For Aggra-
vated Kidnaping, 11 STAN. L. REv. 554 (1959); 10 HASTINGS L.J. 323 (1959).
109. 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 459 P.2d 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1969).
110. See text accompanying notes 129-65 infra.
111. Between them, the two defendants were charged with five counts of kidnaping
for robbery and one count of rape. The jury found the kidnaping for robbery victims
had suffered bodily injury. 71 Cal. 2d at 1122, 459 P.2d at 226, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
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sufficient to support defendants' convictions of violating section 209."1
The court, however, termed Chessman and Wein "obstructions to the
flow" of common sense in the construction and application of kidnaping
statutes.113  The unanimous court in Daniels felt that the teaching of
time and experience dictated a reconsideration of the legislative intent
behind the 1951 amendment to section 209.11,
In its reinterpretation of "kidnaps . . .to commit robbery," the
court in Daniels initially considered the meaning of kidnaping within the
context of section 209. The court in Daniels reasoned that the word
"kidnaps" in section 209 refers to the definition of simple kidnaping in
section 207.:5 The court recognized that some brief movements are
necessarily incidental to the crime of armed robbery"16 and concluded
that such incidental movements were not intended by the legislature to
fall within the scope of kidnaping for robbery because they did not
constitute kidnaping under section 207.7 Support for this holding was
found in the court's earlier decision of Cotton v. Superior Court."8 In
Cotton, alleged violations of simple kidnaping under section 207
stemmed from assaults by union organizers upon farm workers during a
riot at a farm labor camp.: 9 Upon ordering that the kidnaping counts
be dismissed, the court in Cotton held that a technical asportation did
not constitute simple kidnaping when the movement was merely inci-
dental to an underlying assault, since "the Legislature could not reason-
ably have intended that such incidental movement be a taking ' ...
from one part of the country to another.' "120 Thus, under the reason-
ing and language of Cotton, any movement incidental to a robbery does
not constitute a kidnaping and consequently falls outside the scope of
section 209.121
112. Id. at 1126, 459 P.2d at 229, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
113. Id. at 1127, 459 P.2d at 229, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
114. Id. at 1127-28, 459 P.2d at 229-30, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
115. Id. at 1131, 459 P.2d at 232, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 904, quoting People v. Wein, 50
Cal. 2d 383, 415, 326 P.2d 457, 476 (1958) (Carter, J., dissenting).
116. 71 Cal. 2d at 1134, 459 P.2d at 234, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
117. Id.
118. 56 Cal. 2d 459, 364 P.2d 241, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1961).
119. After failing to persuade the braceros to come out of the camp voluntarily, the
union strikers forced their way in and resorted to violence. Convictions under section
207 were based on the forced movements cf three farm workers. One bracero was
chased into the barracks, then ordered out by strikers armed with sticks, stones, and
knives. A second bracero was shoved by strikers toward the camp's front gate. The third
was pulled from a toilet, struck on the head, and dragged some fifteen feet before being
thrown to the ground. Id. at 463-64, 364 P.2d at 243-44, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68.
120. Id. at 465, 364 P.2d at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
121. The court in Daniels found in a landmark opinion by the New York Court of
Appeals additional persuasive authority for holding that movements incidental to other
crimes do not constitute kidnaping. See 71 Cal. 2d at 1135, 459 P.2d at 235, 80 Cal.
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The treatment of kidnaping in Daniels indicated a further legisla-
tive limit on the scope of section 209. The 1951 amendment was a
clear indication that the legislature did not want the aggravated kidnap-
ing statute to apply to standstill robberies. 2 ' In Daniels, the court
announced that the legislature also intended that section 209 not apply
to robberies involving movement which was merely incidental to the
robbery.123 Moreover, the court announced an additional limitation on
the scope of the statute by adopting a selective application approach to
kidnaping for robbery. According to the court, the legislature did not
intend section 209 to apply to a robbery if the asportation did not
"substantially increase" the risk of harm over the risks inherent in
robbery.
1 24
This new interpretation of "kidnaps. . . to commit robbery" was
then applied to the facts of Daniels. The court found that the brief
movements which the defendants compelled their robbery victims to
perform were "merely incidental to [the robbery] and did not substan-
tially increase the risk of harm otherwise present." 25 Consequently,
the defendants' convictions of kidnaping for robbery were reversed. 2 6
People v. Daniels is a landmark decision in the law of kidnaping
because it abrogated the eighteen year-old Chessman interpretation of
section 209-a construction which predicated application of the kidnap-
ing for robbery portion of the statute on the mere fact of forcible
removal in connection with a robbery. 27  By rejecting the Chessman
interpretation, the court in Daniels effected a significant change in the
definition of this offense. Summarizing this new definition, the opinion
concluded:
[W]e hold that the intent of the Legislature in amending Penal
Code section 209 in 1951 was to exclude from its reach not only"standstill" robberies . . . but also those in which the movements
of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the rob-
bery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and
above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself.'2
Development of a Two-Prong Test
The court in Daniels limited its discussion to movements during a
robbery which would not constitute kidnaping for robbery. 12 9 Because
Rptr. at 907 (1969), quoting People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 164, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844,
256 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (1965).
122. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra.
123. 71 Cal. 2d at 1139, 459 P.2d at 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1140, 459 P.2d at 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1139, 459 P.2d at 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
128. Id. (citations omitted).
129. See id.
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the facts of Daniels fell within these categories, the court was not
required to describe the facts which would constitute kidnaping for
robbery.1 0 In the exclusionary terms of Daniels, there can be no
conviction of kidnaping for robbery if: (1) the movements are merely
incidental to the robbery; or (2) the movements do not substantially
increase the risk of harm.131
In a line of cases following Daniels, the supreme court has inverted
the exclusionary langauge of Daniels and developed a two-prong test
which is stated in affirmative terms. 13 2 Under this formula, the move-
ment of a victim during a robbery constitutes kidnaping for robbery
when the following two-prong test is met:
(1) Movement Test: the movement must be more than merely
incidental to the robbery (in other words, there must be a
kidnaping); and
(2) Increased Risk Test: the movement must substantially in-
crease the victim's risk of harm over the risk inherent in
robbery.
The next two sections of this note separately analyze the court's
application of each prong of this test.
The Movement Test
The supreme court experienced no difficulty in applying the move-
ment test to cases which immediately followed Daniels. Quite often the
court was able to hold, without elaboration, that the movements of the
victim in connection with the robbery were merely "incidental move-
ments.' 38  Consequently, the kidnaping for robbery convictions were
130. See id. at 1140 n.14, 459 P.2d at 238, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
131. See id. Some authorities have indicated that if the movement is more than
incidental to the robbery, kidnaping for robbery will apply irrespective of whether the
movement increased the risk of harm. See, e.g., In re Bryant, 19 Cal. App. 3d 933, 937-
39, 97 Cal. Rptr. 40, 42-44 (1971) (concurring opinion); People v. Stathos, 17 Cal. App.
3d 33, 38-39, 94 Cal. Rptr. 482, 484-85 (1971); The Supreme Court of California 1969-
1970, 59 CALiF. L. REv. 30, 189 (1971). The supreme court has rejected this assertion
outright. See In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d 122, 127-28, 534 F.2d 721, 724-25, 120 Cal. Rptr.
881, 884-85 (1975).
132. See, e.g., In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d 122, 127, 534 P.2d 721, 724-25, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 881, 884-85 (1975). The logic of stating this two-prong test in affirmative terms
is questionable. The court in Daniels indicated that kidnaping for robbery is not
committed in the absence of two specific elements. The court in Daniels did not state
that those two elements are all that is necessary to constitute the offense. See text
accompanying notes 167-69 infra.
133. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 4 Cal. 3d 429, 482 P.2d 657, 93 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1971) (moving liquor store employee to rear storage area was merely incidental to
robbery); People v. Ungrad, 4 Cal. 3d 420, 482 P.2d 653, 93 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1971)
(moving victims to various rooms to look for valuables during robbery was merely
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reversed, usually by a unanimous court." 4 Not until 1974 did a sharp
disagreement arise on the bench as to which movements are incidental
within the meaning of the movement test.
In 1974 the supreme court heard the case of People v.
Thornton."3 5 In Thornton the defendant had been found guilty on two
counts of kidnaping for robbery. These two convictions were based on
the following facts. As an eighteen year-old girl entered her car, the
defendant forced his way into the vehicle, commandeered it, and drove
away while holding the victim's head with his right arm. He drove four
blocks before parking the car and committing robbery and rape. The
second count of kidnaping for robbery was based on slighter movement.
The defendant approached a woman outside a tavern, forcing her at
gunpoint to walk down the street for approximately one block. There,
behind a deserted service station, he forced her into a parked car, took
money from her purse, and sexually assaulted her.
In affirming the two convictions of kidnaping for robbery, the
majority in Thornton stated:
It is clear that the asportation of the victim in each of these cases
was not "merely incidental to the commission of the robbery"....
The fact that in each case defendant chose to consummate the rob-
bery at a location remote from the place of initial contact does
not render the subsequent asportation "merely incidental" to the
crime, for it is the very fact that defendant utilized substantial
asportation in the commission of the crime which renders him liable
to the increased penalty of section 209 if that asportation was such
that the victim's risk of harm was substantially increased there-
by.136
Significantly, the majority in Thornton found the movements to
have been more than incidental without reference to feet and inches.
Rather, the court used such terms as "substantial asportation" and
described the asportation as having been to a "remote" location. With-
out further discussion, the majority went on to hold, as a matter of law,
that the asportation of each victim had not been merely incidental to the
crime of robbery, therefore satisfying the movement element of the two-
prong test.13
7
incidental to robbery); People v. Adame, 4 Cal. 3d 417, 482 P.2d 652, 93 Cal. Rptr. 740
(1971) (moving two market employees from check stand to office was merely incidental
to robbery).
134. The majority of these cases arose as a result of the court's ruling that the
interpretation of section 209 expressed in Daniels applied retroactively. This ruling
entitled a defendant whose conviction of kidnaping for robbery became final before the
Daniels decision to post-conviction relief upon a showing that his conduct was not
prohibited by section 209 as construed in Daniels. See People v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389,
395-97, 482 P.2d 633, 636-38, 93 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724-26 (1971).
135. 11 Cal. 3d 738, 523 P.2d 267, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1974).
136. Id. at 768, 523 P.2d at 287, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 769 n.20, 523 P.2d at 288, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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Justice Mosk, in his dissenting and concurring opinion in
Thornton, disagreed with the majority's view of these movements. Jus-
tice Mosk apparently examined asportation strictly in terms of the actual
distance traveled and found it insufficient."8" He retraced the move-
ments of each section 209 incident and found that the total distance
covered had been four blocks in the first incident and only one block in
the second incident. Viewing the movements only in terms of distance
traveled, Justice Mosk objected to the majority's reference to movements
of one and four blocks as remote. He reasoned that the displacement of
each victim had been no more than a brief movement to facilitate the
robbery and hence had been incidental within the meaning of
Daniels.'3 9 Justice Mosk also criticized the majority for holding "as a
matter of law" that a movement of only one city block constitutes
kidnaping. Reasoning that this holding created a blatantly arbitrary
measurement, he feared it would serve as a standard for cases to
follow. 140
Justice Mosk's fears were realized in the recent decision in In re
Earley.'41 In Earley, convictions of kidnaping for robbery, under
section 209, and robbery, under section 211, were based on the follow-
ing facts. The defendant approached the victim's car, which was
stopped at an intersection. Holding a gun-shaped cigarette lighter, the
defendant commandeered the vehicle and drove ten blocks before taking
the victim's watch and eight dollars and fleeing on foot.
In Earley, the court announced that the movement of a victim for a
substantial distance to facilitate a robbery would satisfy the movement
test. The court used the following three-step reasoning process to
justify this conclusion: (1) "Brief movements to facilitate either
robbery or robbery and rape are incidental thereto within the meaning
of Daniels";142 (2) "[o]n the other hand movements to facilitate the
foregoing crime or crimes [robbery or robbery and rape] that are for a
substantial distance rather than brief are not incidental thereto within
the meaning of Daniels"; 43 (3) therefore, "[m]ovements for a substan-
tial distance within one county manifestly constitute a carrying from
one part of the county to another.' ",144
In affirming the conviction under section 209, the majority in
Earley found the ten-block movement involved in that case to have been
138. See id. at 775-77, 523 P.2d at 292-93, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
139. Id. at 776, 523 P.2d at 293, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
140. Id. at 777, 523 P.2d at 293, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
141. 14 Cal. 3d 122, 534 P.2d 721, 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1975).
142. Id. at 129, 534 P.2d at 726, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 130, 534 P.2d at 726, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (citations omitted).
144. Id., citing CAL. PEN. CODE § 207 (West 1970).
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a substantial asportation which satisfied the movement test.14 The
court did not, however, look to the facts and circumstances of the case to
determine whether the asportation had been substantial. Instead, the
majority in Earley merely relied on previous cases in which a shorter
distance had been termed "more than incidental." Citing the opinion in
Thornton, the majority in Earley held:
[Miovement in the instant case was 10 to 13 blocks. Movement
of that distance or less has been expressly or impliedly viewed as
substantial rather than brief in cases involving section 209 and sec-
tion 207. Since the movement here was substantial, it was not
"merely incidental to the commission of the robbery"....146
Under the reasoning in Earley, the movement test will be satisfied
upon a finding of substantial asportation. The method which the court
in Earley used to determine whether there had been substantial asporta-
tion indicates that the court will not examine the circumstances of the
particular case, nor will the asportation be viewed in relation to the
robbery. Rather, the court will merely measure the distance and then
look to earlier decisions to see whether that distance has been held to be
a "substantial asportation."
Since the court in Thornton found one block to be a substantial
asportation, one block is apparently the threshold distance which consti-
tutes kidnaping. 147  Therefore, regardless of the circumstances, any
movement of a victim, during a robbery, of one block or more is a
substantial asportation and satsifies the movement element of the two-
prong test for determining kidnaping for robbery.
The Increased Risk Test
The court in Daniels reasoned that the legislature intended to
preclude application of the kidnaping for robbery provision when the
movement involved in the robbery did not substantially increase the
victim's risk of injury. 148  On the basis of this interpretation, the court
uses the increased risk test in conjunction with the movement test to
determine whether a defendant's acts constitute kidnaping for robbery.
145. See id. at 130-31, 534 P.2d at 726-27, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87.
146. Id. at 130, 534 P.2d at 726-27, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87 (citations omitted).
147. Implementation of this one-block standard has even been used to overrule prior
cases in which an asportation of more than one block had been held to be merely
incidental. The court in Earley, implementing this one-block reasoning, stated that
Thornton had impliedly overruled People v. Timmons, 4 Cal. 3d 411, 482 P.2d 648, 93
Cal. Rptr. 736 (1971), in which the court had held a five-block asportation to be merely
incidental to the robbery. See 14 Cal. 3d at 130-31, 132 n.14, 534 P.2d at 726-27, 728,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 886-87, 888.
148. People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1139, 459 P.2d 225, 238, 80 Cal. Rptr.
897, 910 (1969).
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The supreme court initially discussed the nature of the increased
risk test in the opinion in People v. Timmons.'4" In Timmons, the
defendant approached the car of two market employees who were
returning from the bank with $15,600 in their possession. The defend-
ant hijacked the car, which was then driven according to his directions
while the passenger-employee surrendered the sacks of money to the
defendant. After a five-block drive, the defendant directed the driver to
pull the car over to the curb, where he exited with the money. The
court in Timmons issued an order to vacate the judgments on the
kidnaping for robbery counts because the movements had not substan-
tially increased the risk.150
Writing for the majority in Timmons, Justice Mosk clarified his
original reference in Daniels to movements which "substantially increase
the risk of harm." Stating that this language did not refer to an increase
in the likelihood the robbery would occur, Justice Mosk explained:
"Rather, we intended to refer to an increase in the risk that the victim
may suffer significant physical injuries over and above those to which a
victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed.''"
In Timmons, Justice Mosk also emphasized that not every kidnap-
ing committed during a robbery constitutes kidnaping for robbery. He
explained that an act of kidnaping may create some slight increase in the
risk of injury to the victim. 15 2 Such a kidnaping, Justice Mosk stated,
would not constitute kidnaping for robbery, since it would not substan-
tially increase the risk. 53
Justice Sullivan's concurring and dissenting opinion in a compan-
ion case, People v. Mutch,' 4 is of particular significance to a discussion
of the increased risk test.155 In that opinion, Justice Sullivan urged the
majority to view asportation in light of the totality of the circumstances.
Contending that the destination toward which the movement is direct-
ed should be considered, Justice Sullivan states:
It is conceivable that movement with or without assaultive acts to
a remote place may substantially increase the risk of harm over
that necessarily present in the underlying crime, by reducing or
even removing the probability of the victim's appeals for help or
by exposing him to abusive conduct not otherwise feasible. 56
149. 4 Cal. 3d 411, 482 P.2d 648, 93 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1971).
150. See id. at 414-16, 482 P.2d at 650-51, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 738-39.
151. Id. at 414, 482 P.2d at 650, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
152. See id. at 415-16, 482 P.2d at 651, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
153. Id.
154. 4 Cal. 3d 389, 482 P.2d 633, 93 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1971).
155. In Mutch, the court held that the conduct of an armed robber who had forced
victims to crawl into adjacent rooms did not constitute kidnaping for robbery. See id. at
397, 482 P.2d at 638, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
156. Id. at 400, 482 P.2d at 640, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (concurring & dissenting
opinion).
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In In re Crumpton,157 a habeas corpus proceeding, the court
rejected Justice Sullivan's suggestion that the increased risk test could be
satisfied solely by removing the victim from public view. The kidnap-
ing for robbery conviction in Crumpton had been based on a service
station robbery in which the defendant had forced the attendant to walk
approximately thirty feet and lie down behind a truck. The attorney
general argued that the movement had aggravated the risk by diminish-
ing the likelihood of public observation of the infliction of physical harm
on the attendant. The court, however, rejected this contention, stating
that "acts of removing the victim from public view do not in themselves
substantially increase the risk of harm within our rule in Daniels."'l 8
Thus, the court in Crumpton ruled that removal of the victim from
public view is a factor, but is not determinative, in considering whether
the movement substantially increased the victim's risk of harm.
The manner of forcible control exerted over the victim during the
asportation, however, may be sufficient to satisfy the increased risk
test.159 In Thornton, the manner of forcible control was held, as a
matter of law, to have substantially increased the risk of harm over that
inherent in robbery.'60 The record in Thornton indicates the forcible
control which was used during the asportation: one victim was held
around the neck by the defendant's right arm as he drove with his left
arm. The other victim was forcibly controlled by being made to walk at
gunpoint in front of the defendant. Without describing the particular
risks created by the forcible control, the court in Thornton ruled:
[A]ny substantial asportation which involves forcible control of the
robbery victim such as that occurring in this case exposes her to
grave risks of harm to which she would not have been subject had
the robbery occurred at the point of initial contact.161
The above cases serve as a foundation for the court's increased risk
test. To satisfy this test, there must be a risk beyond the risk of robbery
that the victim will suffer bodily injury.' 62 While a kidnaping may well
create some risks, the act does not meet the increased risk test unless the
kidnaping increases the risks substantially. 6 3  Such risks may be cre-
ated by the manner of forcible control during -the asportation.14 The
dangers which arise solely from the removal of the victim from public
view, however, are not considered significant enough to satisfy the
157. 9 Cal. 3d 463, 507 P.2d 74, 106 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1973).
158. Id. at 467, 507 P.2d at 76, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 772 (emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., People v. Lara, 12 Cal. 3d 903, 528 P.2d 365, 117 Cal. Rptr. 549
(1974).
160. See notes 135-38 & accompanying text supra.
161. 11 Cal. 3d at 768, 523 P.2d at 287, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
162. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
163. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
164. See text accompanying notes 159-61 supra.
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test.165 If the asportation is found to be a kidnaping under the move-
ment test, and if that kidnaping satisfies the increased risk test, the act is
deemed to constitute kidnaping for robbery.
A Proposed Alternative Test for
Kidnaping for Robbery
Two landmarks in the twenty-five year history of kidnaping for
robbery since the 1951 amendment to section 209 are the opinion in
Daniels and the subsequently developed two-prong test. While the
court still claims allegiance to Daniels, and all kidnaping for robbery
cases cite Daniels as controlling authority, the two-prong test ignores
some of the views clearly enunciated in Daniels."6 This note proposes
an alternative method to determine kidnaping for robbery. The objec-
tive of this proposed alternative approach is to align the definition of
kidnaping for robbery with the attitudes embraced by Daniels, while
eliminating the maladies which exist under the two-prong test.
Inconsistencies Between Daniels and the Two-Prong Test
The two-prong test is not a precise, logical descendant of Daniels.
The court in Daniels held that -two types of movement (incidental
movements and movements which did not substantially increase the risk
of harm) would not, in conjunction with a robbery, constitute kidnaping
for robbery.167  Apparently grounded on the opinion in Daniels, the
current two-prong test directs that an asportation during a robbery is
kidnaping for robbery if the movement does not fall into these two
categories.'0 " Daniels does not, however, state what type of movement
will violate section 209.60 The court in Daniels may have envisioned
additional requirements before the movement would constitute an ag-
gravated kidnaping.
Nevertheless, the opinion in Daniels does not prohibit the bifurcat-
ed approach of first determining whether the movement constitutes
kidnaping and then determining whether the kidnaping has substantially
increased the risk of harm. Thus, the theory of the two-prong test is not
misplaced; however, certain factors which comprise the two-prong test
165. See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
166. Dissenting in both Earley and Thornton, Justice Mosk stated that the majority
misapplied the treatment of kidnaping for robbery envisioned by the court in Daniels.
See In re Earley, 14 Cal. 3d 122, 133-41, 534 P.2d 721, 729-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. 881, 889-
94 (1975) (dissenting opinion); People v. Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 770-83, 523 P.2d
267, 288-98, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 488-98 (1974) (concurring & dissenting opinion).
167. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 129-30 supra.
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are directly contrary to views expressed in Daniels. These factors are
found in both the movement test and the increased risk test.
The movement element of the two-prong test has defined kidnap-
ing as being a movement of one block or more.1"' Such a definition is
diametrically opposed to the theories articulated in Daniels. The court
in Daniels emphasized that kidnaping should not be defined by an
established distance standard.17' The Daniels decision spoke of the
importance of defining kidnaping in flexible terms.'
2
The movement element also conflicts with the Daniels mandate of
a case by case determination of kidnaping. Under the two-prong test,
kidnaping is determined by arbitrarily measuring the asportation, with-
out regard to the relation between the movement and the robbery. The
language in Daniels, however, indicates that determinations concerning
kidnaping for robbery should involve examination of the totality of the
circumstances in each act of robbery. The consideration envisioned in
Daniels was a determination of whether the movement was "merely
incidental to" the act of robbery.'7 3 The opinion in Daniels reasoned
that this determination is made by examining whether the asportation
played a "significant role" in the robbery.'7 The court in Daniels also
referred to examining the "criminological significance" of the asporta-
tion to determine kidnaping. 7  Thus, the act of robbery peculiar to
each case must be considered in order to determine whether the asporta-
tion played a significant role in the crime. Moreover, all the particular
circumstances must be considered to determine whether the asportation
had any criminological significance. The two-prong test's application
of an arbitrary one-block rule does not provide for this type of flexible
determination.
The current increased risk element of the two-prong test also
departs from the Daniels notion of kidnaping for robbery. The two-
prong test continues to follow the holding of Crumpton that a removal
of the victim from public view will not, by itself, satisfy the increased
risk test.176 This doctrine should be rejected, since the removal from
public view might substantially increase the victim's risk of injury over
the risks inherent in robbery.' 7 7  Certainly, a degree of physical abuse is
170. See text accompanying notes 135-47 supra.
171. See 71 Cal. 2d at 1128, 459 P.2d at 230, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
172. See id. at 1128-29, 459 P.2d at 230, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
173. See id. at 1134, 459 P.2d at 234, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
174. See id. at 1137, 459 P.2d at 236, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
175. See id. at 1138, 459 P.2d at 237, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
176. See text accompanying notes 157-58 supra.
177. The court in Crumpton failed to give recognition to the many appellate
decisions which had found that the removal of a victim from public view had substantial-
ly increased the risk of injury. See, e.g., In re Lokey, 41 Cal. App. 3d 767, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 299 (1974) (defendants took a husband and wife from "a place of safety" to a
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common to robbery.178  Nevertheless, if a robbery victim is removed
from public view, he is subject to a higher degree of physical abuse than
might otherwise be feasible.'7 9  Removal from society provides time and
seclusion for an extended assault; the robber is allowed to prolong the
confrontation and vent his aggressions upon the victim free from obser-
vation. 80 Removal from society also increases the victim's risk of being
cut off from medical aid.' 8 ' These dangers are drastically reduced if
the robbery is performed in public view. Without isolation, the robber
must effectuate the robbery as quickly as possible to avoid detection.
Complicating the robbery with an extended physical assault would
increase the possibility of apprehension or intervention by third par-
ties.'82 Thus, since the removal of a victim from public view might
create dangers substantially greater than the dangers inherent in rob-
bery, such an act could satisfy the requirement of Daniels. Yet the
increased risk test fails to give full weight to such hazards. Consequent-"
ly, the two-prong test undercuts crucial dangers of kidnaping which
might constitute kidnaping for robbery according to Daniels.
By defining kidnaping in terms of a specific distance, by applying
that standard arbitrarily, and by failing to recognize fully the dangers of
removal from society, the two-prong test deviates drastically from the
views expressed in Daniels. This note proposes that the judiciary aban-
don the two-prong test and determine kidnaping for robbery according
to the approach suggested in Daniels.
The Daniels Approach to Kidnaping for Robbery
The court in Daniels did not attempt to change any statute. The
decision simply reflected a revised interpretation of the legislative in-
remote spot in the country where the wife was raped and the husband was murdered);
People v. Curtis, 21 Cal. App. 3d 704, 98 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1971) (victims were taken
from a well-lighted intersection for five blocks to a deserted place under freeway
construction where one victim was robbed); People v. Hill, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 98
Cal. Rptr. 214 (1971) (victim was threatened with a hatchet while in public view in a
parking lot and shot by the defendant when removed from public observation inside a
store); People v. Miller, 12 Cal. App. 3d 922, 91 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1970) (defendants
picked up young women on a busy street comer, drove to a distant quiet residential area,
and robbed and raped them).
178. "Pistol-whipping, unfortunately, is a risk inherent in the crime of armed
robbery. . . ." People v. Mutch, 4 Cal. 3d 389, 398, 482 P.2d 633, 638, 93 Cal. Rptr.
721, 726 (1971).
179. The fact that the dangers did not materialize does not mean that the risk of
harm was not substantially increased by the asportation. See People v. Milan, 9 Cal. 3d
185, 193, 507 P.2d 956, 961, 107 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (1973).
180. See In re Lokey, 41 Cal. App. 3d 767, 772, 116 Cal. Rptr. 299, 302 (1974).
181. See People v. Mays, 17 Cal. App. 3d 641, 644, 95 Cal. Rptr. 190, 192 (1971).
182. See People v. Ellis, 15 Cal. App. 3d 66, 73, 92 Cal. Rptr. 907, 912 (1971).
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tent. 8 ' As discussed earlier, the phrase "kidnaps . . . to commit
robbery" is susceptible to several interpretations.18 4  The court in Dan-
iels decided that the interpretation which the legislature intended used
the term "kidnaps" according to the definition of simple kidnaping in
seciton 207.185 The court in Daniels also determined that the legisla-
ture contemplated a selective application of the sanctions of section 209,
intending that the penalties provided in the statute be imposed only when
a kidnaping in conjunction with intent to commit robbery created dan-
gers in addition to those inherent in robbery.'86 Daniels is apparently an
accurate reflection of the intent of the legislature, since the legislature
adopted the language of Daniels in its recent enactment restoring the
death penalty in California.'
8 7
The court in Daniels did not enunciate a formula for determining
whether an asportation during a robbery constitutes kidnaping for rob-
bery. The language in the unanimous Daniels opinion, however, sug-
gests that the court approached the problem by examining the risks of
harm created by the movement to determine whether the asportation
was "merely incidental to the robbery," and also to determine whether
the movement substantially increased the risk of injury.
Under the reasoning in Cotton, the court in Daniels held that
movements merely incidental to the robbery do not constitute the kid-
naping element of section 209.188 As noted in People v. Ellis,189 "a
reading of Daniels, and the authorit[ies] there relied upon, [show] that
the term 'incidental' was used in the sense that the asportation play[ed]
no significant or substantial part in the planned robbery . . .,.
Whether the asportation is significant or plays a substantial role can be
determined by looking at the risks it creates. If the asportation does not
create any dangers in addition to those inherent in an act of robbery, the
movement is merely incidental because it is not significant or a substan-
tial part of the robbery.' 9 ' If, on the other hand, the asportation creates
additional risks of harm, the movement is significant and plays a sub-
stantial part in the crime. Thus, if the asportation of a victim creates
additional risks of harm, that asportation constitutes kidnaping accord-
ing to the reasoning of Daniels.
183. See 71 Cal. 2d at 1127-28, 459 P.2d at 229-30, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 901-02.
184. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra.
185. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
186. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
187. See Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 719, § 5(b)(3)(ii), at 1299.
188. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
189. 15 Cal. App. 3d 66, 92 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1971).
190. Id. at 70, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
191. See People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1137-38, 459 P.2d 225, 236-37, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 908-09 (1969).
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The court in Daniels indicated that an examination of the risks
created by the asportation should continue if the movement is found to
be a kidnaping. The court held that even if the movement is more than
incidental, the sanctions of kidnaping for robbery will not apply if the
kidnaping does not "substantially increase the risk of harm."192  The
act of kidnaping may create certain dangers which justify punishment
but which may increase the risk only slightly. 93 Thus, there must be
an examination as to the degree of risk created by the asportation to see
whether the victim's risk of injury was substantially increased thereby.
Proposed Alternative Method To Determine Kidnaping for Robbery:
Examining the Risk of Harm
The California judiciary should determine what constitutes kidnap-
ing for robbery by the method indicated in Daniels. Examining the risk
of harm would reveal whether the movement was more than incidental
to the robbery and whether the danger was substantially increased.
Thus, the risk of harm examination would determine both the threshold
question of whether there was a kidnaping and the ultimate question of
whether the offense constitutes kidnaping for robbery. The suggested
inquiry would entail a measurement of the risk of injury to the victim.
If the movement increased the risk already inherent in robbery, the act
of asportation would be punishable. The degree of punishment would
depend upon the degree to which the asportation increased the victim's
risk of injury.
The fact that a person was moved during the commission of a
robbery would trigger this risk of harm examination. The inquiry
would result in one of three findings:
(1) The movement may not have created any risk of harm to the
victim in addition to those already present in the robbery. In such a
case, the movement was merely incidental to the robbery and does not
constitute kidnaping; nor does the movement deserve independent pun-
ishment.194
(2) The movement may have created a slight increase in the
victim's risk of injury. Such a determination would be reasonable when
the circumstances of the asportation created a remote possibility of
injury. In such a case, the movement was more than incidental because
it created additional risks.1 95 Thus the movement constitutes kidnap-
192. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
193. See People v. Timmons, 4 Cal. 3d 411, 415-16, 482 P.2d 648, 651, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 736, 739 (1971).
194. See People v. Daniels, 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1134-39, 459 P.2d 225, 234-38, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 906-10 (1969).
195. See id.
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ing.196 Since the kidnaping did not substantially increase the risk of
injury, however, the act of compelled movement does not constitute
kidnaping for robbery under section 209.111 Nonetheless, the asporta-
tion would fall within the definition of kidnaping in section 207. Thus,
the assailant could be punished for his act of robbery under section 211
and for simple kidnaping under section 207.
(3) The movement may have substantially increased the risk of
injury beyond the risk inherent in robbery. Such a result may have
occurred because many different dangers were created by the circum-
stances of the asportation or because the asportation created a particular
danger which was likely to occur. These conditions characterize the
movement as kidnaping for robbery. The legislature apparently feels
that if the movement created substantial dangers over the risks caused
by the robbery, the asportation constitutes an aggravated kidnaping
rather than a simple kidnaping. The assailant in this situation would be
found to have violated both sections 211, which proscribes robbery, and
section 209, which punishes kidnaping for robbery.
Since a certain risk of injury is inherent in every robbery, all the
circumstances surrounding the asportation must be examined to deter-
mine whether the movement increased that risk. A proper considera-
tion of the dangers associated with the asportation would focus on the
following factors: (1) the distance traveled; (2) the duration of the
asportation; (3) the mode of asportation; 198 and (4) the degree of
change in locale.'99 The risk of harm examination would measure the
degree of severity of any dangers connected with these factors to deter-
mine whether the asportation constitutes simple kidnaping or aggravated
kidnaping.
The risk of harm examination would eliminate the need for the
two-prong test. This alternative approach would perform the function
of the increased risk test, and a separate movement test would be
unnecessary because that determination would be subsumed within the
risk of harm examination. For example, a movement which increases
the risk of injury has some significance in the crime. According to
Daniels, a movement with criminological significance is not an inciden-
tal movement and therefore constitutes kidnaping. 200 The risk of harm
examination could establish the existence of additional risks, thus deter-
196. See id.
197. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
198. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 2 Cal. App. 3d 345, 82 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1969)
(manner of detention included high speed auto chase resulting in fatal crash).
199. See, e.g., People v. Curtis, 21 Cal. App. 3d 704, 98 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1971)
(asportation of victims resulted in removal from well-lighted intersection to deserted,
dark place beneath freeway under construction).
200. See 71 Cal. 2d 1119, 1134-39, 459 P.2d 225, 234-38, 80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 906-10
(1969).
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mining that the movement was more that incidental, as well as establish-
ing the degree of any dangers.
Abandoning the two-prong test and adopting this alternative risk
of harm examination is suggested both because it would facilitate analy-
sis and, more importantly, because it would effectively incorporate the
views of the court in Daniels. By abandoning the two-prong test, the
judiciary would no longer be saddled with the arbitrary one-block defini-
tion of kidnaping. Under the risk of harm examination, the court
would scrutinize the particular facts of each case to determine whether a
movement constitutes kidnaping. This approach would involve precise-
ly the type of inquiry envisioned by the court in Daniels.20 1 Further-
more, the risk of harm examination would require sensitivity to all the
circumstances and dangers arising from the asportation.
The suggested approach would not be drastically different from the
present two-prong test. The alternative method would not redefine
"kidnaps . . . to commit robbery," nor would it modify the Daniels
court's interpretation of the legislative intent underlying the statutory
proscription of this crime. Rather, a risk of harm examination would
simply and properly apply the principles articulated by the court in
Daniels to determine kidnaping for robbery.
Conclusion
Some authorities consider section 209 to be an anomaly in Califor-
nia penal law.20 2 They question, for example, why a kidnaping com-
mitted for the purpose of rape is only a simple kidnaping offense
punishable under section 207, while a kidnaping for the purpose of
robbery may be punished with the more severe sanction of the aggravat-
ed kidnaping statute, section 209. Yet a decision to delete kidnaping
for robbery from section 209, or to expand the scope of the statute to
encompass kidnapings committed with other criminal intents, is left to
the legislature. Meanwhile, kidnaping for robbery continues as a Cali-
fornia law which the courts should seek to apply as rationally as
possible.
A risk of harm examination is a rational technique which provides
a feasible approach to the problem of determining what constitutes
kidnaping for robbery. Most important, this method would fulfill the
objective of the court in Daniels by bringing reason and common sense
to the law of kidnaping in California.
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